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Abstract
During a crisis, authorities need to effectively dissemi-
nate information. We address the problem of deciding how
crisis-related information should be published on Facebook
to reach as many people as possible. We examine three
recent terrorist attacks in Berlin, London and Stockholm.
Our specific focus lies with official Facebook pages by
municipalities and emergency service agencies. We collected
posts about the events, along with the number of shares, likes
and emotional reactions to them. In a regression analysis,
several variables were examined that capture decisions on
which information to publish and how. Posts containing
condolences were found to result in three times as many
emotional reactions as other posts, all other variables held
constant. Images and videos positively affected the number
of reactions by factors of 2.2 and 3.9, respectively, while
text length negatively affected the number of shares. These
results will help in the development of effective guidelines.
1. Introduction
When people are affected by crises such as terror attacks,
they turn to social media to make sense of the situation
[16]. Emergency service agencies (ESAs) have recognised
an opportunity to rapidly disseminate information to many
people and interact with them [31]. Consequently they have
set up Twitter accounts and Facebook pages [54]. However,
it is unclear which factors influence the success of their
posts. To ensure effective emergency management practices,
it is necessary to understand how individuals react to crisis-
related information. In particular, it is essential to learn what
kind of information diffuses on social media.
In this article, we argue that while previous research
has looked at the quantity of interactions, the relationships
between qualitatively different interactions have received
comparatively little attention. Examples on popular social
media services include replies versus retweets on Twitter,
or Facebook shares versus likes. Our assessment especially
applies to the context of crisis management. In addition,
Facebook recently introduced a feature that allows users to
express their views on a post by clicking an emoji [28]. This
data could be highly relevant for emergency management: it
would help responders understand how individuals react to
their posts.
To evaluate the use of such user response data in emer-
gency management, we studied how several variables related
to a post affect the number of times it is shared and liked on
Facebook. For this purpose, we collected posts by emergency
management agencies and municipalities during three recent
terror attacks, along with the reactions to them. The attacks
examined were (1) the December 2016 Berlin truck attack,
(2) the March 2017 attack in Westminster, London, and
(3) the 2017 April Stockholm attack. Among the reactions
collected were the number of shares and likes, and a range
of other emotional reactions including sadness and anger.
Several variables were extracted that capture decisions
made by page administrators and content creators on how
to publish the information. This allowed us to examine their
relative importance in determining user reactions. We also
scrutinised the relationships among qualitatively different
emotional reactions expressed on Facebook by using its new
Reactions feature, and discuss its relevance for emergency
management.
Our work makes several contributions. First, we provide
comprehensive work on social media analytics in the field
of crisis management with a particular focus on Facebook.
By both exploring the topic theoretically and presenting an
empirical study, we seek to advance the understanding of
reactions to postings. Second, we discuss our findings with
the aim of providing generalisable insights. Thereby, we
provide advice for practitioners and contribute to the theory
on social media analytics. Moreover, we hope to stimulate
more work in this relatively unexplored area.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In
Section 2 we explain the background of the tackled topics.
Due to the multi-step nature of our work, we describe our
research design in detail in Section 3. The results of our
study are then given in Section 4. We discuss them in
Section 5 before drawing a conclusion in Section 6.






2.1. Crisis Communication in Emergency Response
In every emergency situation, and even more so in every
crisis, communication is vital [21], [24]. To effectively
mitigate the consequences of incidents, crisis managers (e.g.
from a municipality or the police) must coordinate first
responders and subsequent crisis stakeholders. Ineffective
communication is at least one of several contributing factors
to failed crisis response [38]. Good communication not
only leads to a quicker and more effective crisis response,
but also helps to avoid problems such as responders being
deployed to a site which others have already been deployed
to, possibly leaving another site uncovered.
Communication, however, does not only aid the response
process. Equally, it can make the response easier, reduce
suffering, and possibly even directly mitigate crisis con-
sequences [47]. For this purpose, communication not only
happens between crisis responders but also between crisis
managers (or, in general, authorities) and the population
[18]. If citizens know which kind of crisis they face and
if they are provided with reliable information that helps
them make decisions, they are much less likely to encounter
trouble.
Crisis communication can happen on several levels. Be-
fore a crisis, the population can already be instructed.
Imagine a region is prone to flooding. It helps noticeably
if the population is taught about good procedures in case of
a flood, such as avoiding cellars, switching off electricity,
and looking after elderly neighbours. During crises, the
population can be kept informed with updated news and
with advice. Crises are chaotic, particularly in their onset
[7]; therefore, a hybrid strategy of giving instructions (such
as encouraging people to evacuate an area) and providing
information to calm the population while supporting their
own informed decisions is promising.
There are different ways of reaching the population with
technological means. Traditionally, radio broadcasting was
the main way of informing the public [36]. Currently, short
messages (SMS) are popular for crisis communication due
to the widespread usage of mobile phones [8]. It is not only
possible to broadcast messages to all members of a particular
population but also to all mobiles phones in an area, i.e.
also including visitors [10]. Moreover, more targeted sending
is possible, to e.g. give instructions to people registered
as volunteer helpers. The Web and, recently, social media
services complement the two older possibilities (cf. e.g. [48],
[55]). They are arguably more vulnerable to infrastructure
failures. Consider, for example, an earthquake. It is quite
likely that parts of the electrical and the communication
infrastructure are damaged; in this case, Internet access
(or rather communication modes in general [49]) may be
seriously disrupted. It takes much more damage before the
cellular network is completely inoperable. Radio remains
an option even in cases of the most serious damages.
However, the higher level of media richness, personality, and
in particular the social aspect are strong reasons for using
several channels in crisis communication, as will become
apparent throughout the remainder of this paper (cf. also [1],
[18]).
2.2. The Role of Social Media
Since the advent of social media, its usage has rapidly
increased. Social media platforms generally allow a two-way
communication between individuals, groups, organisations
and (emergency) authorities [58]. Because of social media’s
capabilities for mass communication, the rapid spread of
information and the large potential audience, it has become
an important channel for marketers and others [12]. Some
studies have looked into the dissemination of information on
social media and showed that emotionally charged text yields
stronger reactions and a faster dissemination throughout
a network [52]. For example, hate speech has become a
problem on social media [44].
However, social media has also become an intermediary
for news and other kinds of information due to the fact
that people often consult the platforms’ timelines, i.e. an
aggregated view on postings based on the user’s preferences,
for updates of newspapers or other information providers
[19], [29]. Valuable information is generated in social media
– not only messages or pictures but also by users sharing
location data, interests and relationships and giving likes or
other reactions to original posts [11]. This initiates a back-
channel for organisations which have started to listen to
users’ needs through social media or implemented customer
service [26].
2.2.1. Social Media in Crises. In crisis situations, social
media has gained importance as both an information source
and a communication channel. Several studies have empi-
rically examined how social media was used in different
crisis scenarios: e.g. corporate brand crises [27], natural
disasters [42], [5], riots and demonstrations [14] or acts of
terrorism [45], [34], [9]. For example, Yin et al. [58] used
natural language processing and data mining techniques in
their study in order to enhance situational awareness. This
concept from the military domain has also been adapted for
non-military crisis situations. Based on Twitter data from
eight crisis situations in Australia, including both human-
made and natural disasters, they developed an incident
detection, clustering and visualisation system for emergency
agencies. A more recent study investigated the Twitter
communication during the 2013 Boston Marathon bombings,
the 2014 hostage crisis in Sydney and the Charlie Hebdo
attack in 2015 [4]. The results remain rather descriptive but
indicate a general increase in the number of tweets and a
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higher proportion of retweets and hashtags during a crisis.
Furthermore, they found accounts by the police and news
media to have a strong influence on the communication.
Studies evaluating and consequently recommending com-
munication strategies of crisis authorities in social media are
scarce. Carter et al. [5] found that agencies were not really
listening to crisis-related communication in social media nor
did they respond to comments.
Because any user can publish posts on social media, there
are also rumours and misinformation in the communication
[37], [2]. Though Jong [25] found a self-correction mecha-
nism in the context of a Dutch crisis, the identification of
rumours and wrong information remains a topic of high
interest which needs to be considered when using social
media data.
2.2.2. Twitter Bias in Research. Most works aiming at
the usage of social media data in the context of crisis
communication and emergency response have only looked at
Twitter. In general, there seems to be a bias towards Twitter
in research on social media analytics and related fields. For
example, in a study of humanitarian information processing,
Munro and Manning [35] found that Twitter accounted for
only 0.16 % of messages sent globally, but for 74.29 % of
research papers published in the three databases examined
over the course of one year. In this regard, the value of
statistically valid predictions based on Twitter data has been
challenged [17]. Although there are many reasons to use
Twitter as an information source in crisis situations and in
social media analytics in general (e.g. short messages, tweets
are public by default, detailed API), we need to critically
reflect on how well tweets mirror reality [46], [32]. As
of January 2017, Facebook has 1,871 million active users
whereas Twitter states 317 million only [6].
A comparative study by Eriksson and Olsson [15] inves-
tigated the perception of both Twitter and Facebook with
professionals from ESAs and citizens in Sweden. They
found that ESAs feel more experienced with Facebook than
Twitter though its usage is rather low. Additionally, Twitter
was considered an elite channel used to reach journalists or
decision-makers, whereas Facebook can reach the general
public. Citizens that act as recipients and co-creators on-
site also valued Facebook higher than Twitter [15]. For
example, Facebook was used during the European Floods
of 2013 to organise volunteer communities [43]. Focusing
on the communication sent by fire and police departments
during the 2012 Hurricane Sandy, Hughes et al. [22] found
relatively few departments using social media to inform
and encourage a certain behaviour. They performed a broad
usage analysis of different social media and coded the
retrieved communication (e.g. closure, safety, weather). The
number of reactions (e.g. likes) or shares to assess the po-
tential reach were not included. Though the paper concludes
with general recommendations on how to integrate social
media in emergency response management, these remain
rather high-level.
2.2.3. Facebook Reactions. In February 2016, after a pilot
test in several markets, Facebook made the new Reactions
feature available globally [28]. This feature allows users to
react to posts by clicking an emoji displayed in the user in-
terface alongside the previously available ‘like’ button. The
reactions introduced are ‘love’, ‘haha’, ‘wow’, ‘sad’, and
‘angry’. The new distinction has not yet been used in many
studies. Larsson analysed the frequency of reactions, and
the association between reactions and shares or comments,
respectively [30]. The author concludes that news which
provoke negative reactions get shared and commented on
more, while news with many positive reactions (e.g. love) get
shared and commented on less. In another study about the
new reactions, the predictability of emotions based on texts
of Facebook posts was studied [39]. They used the reactions
to a Facebook post as labels in a supervised machine
learning task, obviating the need for human annotations.
2.3. Emergency Service Agencies
Emergency Service Agencies (ESAs) are the prime re-
sponders to any crisis happening throughout the world. They
range from police, NGOs, and fire brigades to other muni-
cipal authorities or joint agencies for larger areas or whole
countries. Due to the critical aspect of the messages shared
by ESAs which can help save lives and infrastructures, it is
important that messages reach as many people as possible.
Social media have changed the scope of ESAs’ activities
as these media allow to reach many people timely and
efficiently. They can further enable a multi-way information-
sharing platform for all the parties involved in the crisis. In
contrast to the old channels which audiences need to switch
on deliberately, social media are ubiquitous through mobile
devices and push notifications [3]. As an example, during
Hurricane Sandy, ESAs used social media to update the
public about the situation, to issue evacuation orders and
to answers people’s concerns as many affected persons used
social media as a lifeline [22]. Moreover, infrastructure pro-
viders such as water, power and transportation organisations
used social media to share updates on the availability of their
services during crises.
However, after several interviews with public sector emer-
gency managers, Hiltz et al. [20] identified a lack of a
comprehensive guideline as the main reason prohibiting
ESAs from using social media more effectively. Neverthe-
less, research has developed useful though abstract recom-
mendations for the usage of social media in ESAs (e.g. in
[22], [5]). Hence, ESAs have started to use social media
as source for enhancing situational awareness with on-site
information. But the information flow in social media is
updated constantly. Thus it is very difficult to get the overall
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picture while substantial portions of the data are redundant
[40]. Another challenge for ESAs is to make decisions based
on information with unknown credibility (e.g. rumours, fake
news) from both official and unofficial sources [50], [37].
For the dissemination of important information, ESAs
now actively use social media to reach a large proportion
of the population faster [13]. Again, some effort has been
made in the direction of producing a guideline. For example,
The Contribution of Social Media In Crisis Management
(COSMIC) is a EU-funded project to identify how social
media can be most effectively used in crisis situations.
They propose key steps ESAs should follow to publish
information on social media before, during and after a
crisis [23]. They put an emphasis on identifying the target
group, writing specifically for that group, and being con-
cise. Wendling et al. [57] pointed out that building trust
and communicating with the public during normal times
is important because people will always look for familiar
sources of information during a crisis.
Besides the mentioned two-way communication, social
media allows its users to get feedback about the perceptions
of posts and tweets. Reactions such as comments, retweets,
likes or the aforementioned ‘haha’, ‘sad’ etc. on Facebook
can serve as a proxy for the success of the ESAs’ posts.
Since reactions increase the reach of posts, there might be
an interest in formulating posts in a way that more reactions
and, consequently, a higher reach are achieved. Quantitative
studies investigating the effects of writing style or embedded
media on reactions could not be identified. We aim at filling




We revisited previous studies in the realm of crisis com-
munication and emergency response that use social media
data. Above we argued that there is a bias towards the use
of Twitter in studies on social media analytics in general, and
on crisis communication and response in particular. Hence,
we focus on the social networking site Facebook.
Additionally, prior work analysed communication during
crises to identify roles and networks, cluster topics or
describe sense-making processes through categories of in-
formation. In this study, we focus on ESAs’ communication
strategies with regard to their achieved reactions. Further-
more, we innovatively take the different reactions available
on Facebook into account.
Three recent crises were selected for the study: (1) the
2016 Berlin attack when a truck was deliberately driven
into a Christmas market at the Breitscheidplatz on 19
November 2016, (2) the 2017 Westminster attack when
Figure 1: Example Facebook post made by the London
Metropolitan Police Service shortly after the Westminster
incident
a car was deliberately driven into pedestrians on the Wes-
tminster bridge and a police officer stabbed, on 22 March
2017, and (3) the 2017 Stockholm attack when a truck
was deliberately driven into crowds at the shopping street
Drottninggatan, on 7 April 2017. The crises were selected
due their similarity, since they were all classified as acts of
terrorism. They took place in three different countries, all in
Europe.
We adopted the Social Media Analytics Framework of
Stieglitz et al. [53] which has also guided other research.
The model foresees the phases (1) Tracking (using APIs
or other parsing techniques), (2) Preparation (e.g. removing
spam, coding) and (3) Analysis.
A total of 85 Facebook posts were collected from six
relevant Facebook pages (see Table 1 for an overview, and
Figure 1 for an example). We started the data collection by
manually searching for public Facebook pages of authorities
involved in the official communication. The search was
carried out using the Facebook search box, e.g. by searching
for ‘Police London’, and by checking whether the official
websites of municipalities and ESAs provided hyperlinks
to corresponding Facebook pages. For each incident, we
selected one Facebook page run by an ESA and one run
by a municipality. In the case of London and Berlin, the
ESA involved is the official police service; in the case
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Table 1: Facebook pages examined
Berlin London Stockholm
Munici- Berlin.de London Gov Stockholms stad
pality (@Hauptstadt- (@LDNGov) (@sthlmsstad)
portal)
Likes* 41063 55230 876
Posts 2 3 15




Likes* 168643 165429 45281
Posts 10 20 37
Time span 19–26 Dec 2016 22–29 Mar 2017 7–14 Apr 2017
*Page likes as of 12 Jun 2017
of Stockholm, the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency,
an official government agency, runs the website Krisin-
formation.se along with a corresponding Twitter account
and Facebook page. This page publishes information about
ongoing and imminent crises as well as information about
crisis management.
We collected all posts published on these pages within se-
ven days of the incident in May 2017. Related numbers (e.g.
likes and other reactions as well as shares and video views if
applicable) were gathered accordingly. Large numbers were
rounded due to a limitation in the Facebook user interface.
Due to the time (1 to 4 months) between the crises and
the data collection, we expect the posts’ reactions to have
stabilised. Whether a post contained pictures or videos was
also noted.
3.2. Data Preparation
To allow a detailed analysis of the kind of information
and the style used in the ESAs’ posts, we annotated all
collected posts. Prior work has proposed categories in the
context of a natural crisis [22] or riots [14]. The former
is, however, too specific for a weather-related crisis (e.g.
cleanup, closures, damage, donations etc.). The second paper
[14] was used as a basis. It also provides detailed genres such
as demonstration start or number of participants below a
top-level genre information.
We checked whether the proposed top-level genres infor-
mation, encourage behaviour and warning can sufficiently
categorise the posts. The initial screening of the posts sug-
gested to add the genres number of victims and condolences
besides the general genre information.
Lastly, the annotation process included the question whet-
her a post was related to the crisis. Three researchers
independently evaluated and annotated the texts.
After the annotation, we calculated the reliability of
the annotations using Krippendorff’s alpha (see Figure 2).
The variable information was excluded because of its low
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Figure 2: Reliability of the annotation (84 elements, 3
annotators each)
retained and converted to binary using a majority vote: a
post is taken to contain condolences, for example, if at least
two out of three annotators considered it to.
The data set was cleaned for the data analysis. One post
was excluded from the analysis because it did not contain
any text that could be annotated. Twelve posts were excluded
because they were not considered relevant by at least two
out of three raters. The pruned data set contained only
three posts from the Greater London government page, and
two from the Berlin Facebook page. These were removed
due to the low case numbers. Finally, three posts were
excluded for being shares of posts published by a different
Facebook page. These posts had to be excluded from the
analysis because, when a Facebook page shares a post from a
different page, future shares are counted towards the original
post. As a result, it is not possible to distinguish between
the number of times a post was shared due to the ESA’s
followers actually seeing the post and the number of times
it was shared by other Facebook users, including the original
page’s followers. The final data set contained 66 posts which
were used in the analysis. Almost all of the posts were in
the primary language of the respective country, the only
exception being seven posts from Sweden in English, which
is very widely understood there. Table 2a shows descriptive
statistics for the final data set.
3.3. Data Analysis
Negative binomial regressions were calculated to explain
the number of shares and the number of reactions to the
Facebook posts based on the Facebook page the post appea-
red on, text length, the presence of an image, the presence
of a video, and the reliable categories described above. All
calculations were carried out using the statistical software
package R [41] and the R package MASS [56].
Compared with ordinary least squares regression, ge-
neralised linear models allow for error distributions other
than the normal distribution. In this case, the residuals are
assumed to be from a negative binomial distribution, which
is appropriate for a non-negative integer response in the
presence of overdispersion.
The log link function was used, i.e,
log(yˆi) = x
T
i β ⇐⇒ yˆ = exp(xTi β),
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics of the variables for the cleaned sample (n = 66)
(a) Numerical variables
Variable Min 1Q Median 3Q Max Mean % Zero
Likes 3 57.5 174.5 693.2 13000 737.70 0.0
Sadness 0 2 19 112 7400 287.50 21.2
Angry 0 0 1 6 525 21.98 45.5
Haha 0 0 0 0 59 1.15 83.3
Love 0 0 5 22.3 733 51.12 31.8
Wow 0 0 0 1 28 2.08 62.1
All reactions 3 57.5 174.5 1145 21231 1101.60 0.0
Shares 0 24.5 89.5 299 7501 495.35 4.5









where β is the parameter vector, xi is the vector of predictors
for observation i, and yˆi is the conditional mean of the
response given xi. The predictors are thus expected to be
related linearly to the logarithm of the response, instead of
directly to the response. In other words, the addition of an
image to a post is not expected to increase its number of
likes by an absolute number, whether the post has 10 or
10,000 likes. Instead, the image is expected to increase the
number of likes by a percentage. Likewise, the variable text
length was log-transformed with base 2 because a percent
change in the text length is assumed to be associated with
a percent change in the number of shares and reactions.
Dummy variables were introduced to control for the effect
of the page on which the post was published. The number
of reactions to a post is likely to depend to a large degree
on circumstances outside the immediate control of the page
owner at the time the information is posted. These may
include differences in media consumption habits between
different countries and between police and municipality
pages, as well as in the number of followers. Conceptually,
the dummy variables are statistical control variables. Their
inclusion allows us to neutralise the effects of all such
variables that differ between pages, but do not differ between
posts on the same page.
In addition to the regression analyses carried out to
explain the differences in the sum of all reactions as well
as shares, we also examined the correlation coefficients
between the individual reaction types (e.g. sadness, anger).
Finally, we exemplarily studied the posts with the highest
proportion of each reaction to understand which types of
content result in which emotional reactions.
4. Results
4.1. Regression Analysis
To study how post content and other variables affect
the diffusion of Facebook posts, we calculated a negative
binomial regression as described above. The results are
shown in Table 3. The exponentiated coefficients give a ratio
for the change in the expected number of reactions or shares
when the independent variable is increased by 1, all other
variables held constant. In the case of the binary variables,
this corresponds to a change from absence to presence (of
an image, encouragement, etc.). In the case of text length,
it corresponds to a doubling of text length.
The Facebook page that a post was published on has a
strong influence on the results. For example, a post on the
page of Polizei Berlin is expected to accrue 251 times as
many shares, and 158 times as many reactions, as a post on
the City of Stockholm page (the reference category).
However, the results also show that other variables influ-
ence the results. The text length is a major contributor to
the number of shares, since doubling the text length leads
to a decrease in the number of shares by a factor of 0.68,
or 32 % (p = .011).
In contrast, the number of reactions is greatly influenced
by whether or not the post contains media. If it contains
an image, the number of reactions increases by a factor of
2.16 (p = 0.038). The effect of a video is even stronger,
as it increases the number of reactions by a factor of 3.89
(p = 0.020).
Finally, the number of emotional reactions is also gover-
ned to a large degree by whether or not the post expresses
condolences or reports the expression of condolences by a
third party. If it does, the number of reactions is increased
by a factor of 2.99 (p = 0.001).
As for the other variables, these results are inconclusive.
It is not clear whether the other categories such as war-
ning messages and encouragement have any effect at all
on either the number of shares or reactions, whether text
length influences emotional reactions, or whether images and
video influence shares. All of these variables could have a
large influence, as evidenced by the size of the estimated
coefficients, but the standard errors and corresponding p
values are large, so any judgment is best suspended based
on the available data.
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Table 3: Results of the negative binomial regression models (n = 66)
Number of shares Number of reactions
Variable β exp(β) SE Z p β exp(β) SE Z p
(Intercept) 5.20 1.30 4.02 < .000* 3.72 0.86 4.32 < .000*
Controls
Page Krisinformation.se 2.57 13.10 0.58 4.43 < .000* 2.91 18.35 0.39 7.51 < .000*
Page Metropolitan Police London 3.44 31.09 0.65 5.32 < .000* 3.50 33.21 0.43 8.18 < .000*
Page Polizei Berlin 5.53 251.03 0.73 7.59 < .000* 5.06 158.36 0.48 10.47 < .000*
Explanatory variables
log(Text length) −0.39 0.68 0.15 −2.55 .011* −0.14 0.87 0.10 −1.42 .157
Image 0.47 1.59 0.56 0.83 .405 0.77 2.16 0.37 2.07 .038*
Video 1.22 3.40 0.88 1.40 .163 1.36 3.89 0.58 2.33 .020*
Number of victims 0.59 1.81 0.76 0.78 .434 0.59 1.81 0.50 1.18 .238
Warning 1.00 2.71 0.76 1.32 .188 0.43 1.53 0.50 0.85 .398
Encouragement 0.37 1.44 0.44 0.84 .404 −0.21 0.81 0.29 −0.71 .478
Condolences 0.50 1.65 0.52 0.97 .333 1.10 2.99 0.34 3.19 .001*
*p < .05
Table 4: Correlation matrix for Facebook reactions
Likes Sadness Angry Wow Haha Love
Shares .785 .731 .334 .469 .275 .526
Likes .935 .149 .426 .175 .859
Sadness .342 .473 .041 .748
Angry .639 .224 .009
Wow .526 .210
Haha .002
4.2. Relationships between Facebook Reactions
The new Facebook Reactions feature offers the possibility
to provide unique insights regarding the quality of emotions
experienced by Facebook users as they consume content.
To study the relationships between these different emotional
reactions, we calculated the correlation coefficients between
the Facebook reactions (see Table 4).
Upon inspecting the results, it becomes clear that most
of the reactions are related. All correlation coefficients are
positive. However, some pairs exhibit very high correlation
coefficients, such as like and love (r = .859), but also like
and sadness (r = .935). Other pairs appear to be unrelated,
such as sadness and haha (r = 0.041), or angry and love
(r = .009), meaning that they are used in response to
different posts.
To better understand the types of content that resulted
in certain types of reactions, we examined the posts with
the highest proportion of each reaction. These posts may
exemplify the kind of content typical for a specific emotion.
The very first post by Polizei Berlin after the attack was
a factual statement in which they informed the public about
the attack: ‘On the evening of 19.12.2016 a truck was driven
over the walkway at #Breitscheidplatz in people on the
Christmas market . . . ’ (19 Dec 2016, 9:29 PM). Later the
post was updated to include the fact that 12 people had
been killed and to encourage the public to share information
with them via telephone. This post was the one with the
highest proportion of reactions of sadness indicated (61.6 %
of reactions expressed in response to this post). This number
is noteworthy because in almost all other cases the most
frequent reaction was a ‘like’, but not here.
In the post that made the most users angry, as measured by
their use of the Reactions feature (29.7 % were clicks of the
‘angry’ emoji), the Metropolitan Police informed the public
about the identity of the attacker and encouraged people to
call an anti-terrorist hotline if they had information concer-
ning him: ‘Westminster Attack: Man believed responsible
named . . . ’ (23 Mar 2017, 4:49 PM).
Both of these very negatively received posts provided
information that clearly linked the reported data to a terrorist
incident. In contrast, in the post with the highest proportion
of ‘wow’ reactions (2.1 %), Krisinformation.se bluntly asked
its followers to avoid certain areas of the city: ‘Police urge
the public to avoid Sergels torg and the area around it in
central Stockholm.’ (7 Apr 2017, 3:52 PM).
The descriptive statistics in Table 2a made clear that
negative reactions were, unsurprisingly, much more fre-
quently experienced in response to crisis-related information
than positive reactions. Nevertheless, some Facebook users
saw positive aspects in the examined posts. In the post
with the highest proportion of ‘love’ reactions (16.6 %), the
Metropolitan Police reported a statement made by the family
of a police constable who had died during the attack. They
thanked the public and police for their support, stating that
‘. . . we have been overwhelmed by the love and support for
our family, and most especially, the outpouring of love and
respect for our Keith . . . ’ (26 Mar 2017, 1:37 PM). A photo
of the victim was attached to the post.
Finally, the German Police provided some much needed
comic relief when they dispelled a rumour that a second
attack at a shopping mall was imminent, saying ‘. . . Today
the car park of the Gropius Passagen was closed twice. Once
because of overfilling and once because of a broken-down
car in the driveway . . . ’ (23 Dec 2016, 5:55 PM). This post
had the highest proportion of ‘haha’ reactions (2.3 %).
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5. Discussion
Our results show that post content influences both quantity
and quality of user reactions on Facebook. Reactions were
the most negative when the ESAs shared initial information
at the onset of the crisis. The most positive reactions,
however, were observed after the crisis was over, when the
family of a deceased victim thanked the public for their
support. These observations are indicative of sense-making
patterns observed elsewhere in crisis communication [34].
Posts offering condolences could be shown statistically
to result in more emotional reactions from Facebook users
than non-emotional posts. This aligns with previous findings
made in the context of other social media [52], [30].
These results have important practical implications for
those operating the Facebook pages of municipalities and
ESAs during crises. In this context, the number of likes and
shares for a post are key indicators of a post’s performance.
The goal of the agencies concerned is to support community
resilience by disseminating information, warnings and the
encouragement of certain behaviour rapidly to as many
people as possible. In contrast, the posts that really gain
the most visibility in terms of likes and other reactions
are those with emotional content, which are perhaps less
immediately useful for accomplishing the operator’s crisis
response strategy. This is an apparent paradox: the goal of
page owners may be to spread information, but Facebook
users seem to be the most interested in emotional content.
Carter et al. [5] also raised the question whether people
prefer emotional support from peers or official information
from agencies. Our results indicate that ESAs should take
advantage of an emotional style while informing the public.
Our findings have other important implications for the
Facebook pages of municipalities and ESAs. At a glance,
the statistical results can be restated in the following way:
• Keep your posts concise. Doubling their length will
decrease their number of shares by a third, all else
equal.
• Use image and/or video along with text in your post. An
image will approximately double user reactions, while
a video will quadruple them.
• The most important factor, however, that determines
both the number of shares and other reactions is the
number of followers and other variables outside your
immediate control. Prepare accordingly and encourage
as many people as possible to subscribe to your updates
by liking or following your page.
This kind of advice is of course not entirely new [23].
Suggestions to keep posts short and illustrate them are
also being circulated on popular media such as blog posts
by social media marketing agencies1. However, most of
1. For example, see https://blog.hubspot.com/marketing/how-to-write-
blog-post-simple-formula-ht
that evidence is anecdotal. Often it results from qualitative
observations that have not sought to quantify the effect in an
international, cross-cultural setting spanning several crises.
Only rarely are these blog posts backed up by a published
reproducible methodology.
The individual ESAs showed different communication
behaviour. The Polizei Berlin and Krisinformation.se used
shorter texts and appeared to follow some guidelines, whe-
reas the Metropolitan Police London mostly posted long
texts partially with direct quotes that seemed to be taken
from their website. They may consider shortening their
future posts if they want their posts to be shared more
often. On the other hand, many posts of the Metropolitan
Police London were coded as condolence which were shown
statistically to affect the number of reactions. Though topics
such as condolences, thanks of victims etc. are not the
primary task of ESAs, their inclusion could motivate users
to like the ESA page, which in turn will increase the organic
reach in the next crisis situation. Thus, ESAs might want to
consider developing ways to ’nudge’ users to actively spread
their information [33].
Our results also have intriguing implications for our un-
derstanding of information diffusion. There were substantial
differences between the factors leading to more likes and
more shares. Future research could examine the differences
in decision processes between these forms of user interacti-
ons, and the sociological and psychological theories behind
them. These results also mean that it is valuable to study
several different forms of reactions in the same setting, since
the findings may differ considerably.
Of course this research is not without limitations. Unlike
the page owners, we do not have access to the actual reach
of the posts or the number of impressions, but only to the
number of shares and likes, which must serve as proxies –
and should be, for obvious theoretical reasons, very highly
correlated with the variables of interest.
In our analysis of the reactions, we assumed that Fa-
cebook’s Reactions feature makes the emotional response
to a post measurable to some degree. However, the means
reported in Table 2a show that only a fraction of Facebook
users make use of this feature. Even if its use was more
widespread, the five emojis offered could still only provide
a rough indicator of actual emotional reactions. Ideally, the
emotions experienced by users should be measured using
a validated questionnaire or physiological response data –
although such an approach would, of course, be infeasible
for such a large number of posts and users.
In this research, we also ignored the differences between
Facebook pages by including them as dummy variables,
which future research could examine these more closely.
They replaced several omitted variables, such as the owner
of the page, the number of followers, and differences in
usage habits between countries, each of which could affect
the outcome. Previous research has established that com-
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munication patterns differ considerably between crises [51].
Unsurprisingly, the dummy variables had large coefficients,
which shows that they indeed had a strong influence on the
results. Since these variables are outside the control of the
page owner, they are unlikely to be of immediate interest
to ESAs. However, they could still be of interest to the
research community, and in the future could be examined
individually. The language of a post may likewise affect its
diffusion, especially when the post is in a minority language,
and it will affect text length, especially when the languages
are not closely related. Finally, the time of day and time of
year an event occurs may affect reactions. To study these
effects, posts will have to be collected from many more
pages in a larger study that spans a longer period of time.
6. Conclusion
In this paper we argued that social media provide an
opportunity for ESAs and other stakeholders to dissemi-
nate information more effectively by listening out to their
reactions and optimising posts accordingly. It has become
clear that page owners should not only care about how many
users interact with a post, but also how they interact with it.
The emotions they experience when perceiving the content
play a role in determining how many people will see it
and can benefit from it during the crisis. The possibilities
offered by social media in this regard are becoming more
and more detailed. If more users adopt Facebook’s Reactions
mechanism, page administrators will have a detailed picture
of how audiences react to their content and an opportunity
to fine-tune their information dissemination strategies accor-
dingly. We showed several ways in which measurable user
reactions are influenced by the content of a post, opening
the door for further research in this area. The academic
community can help by carrying out evidence-based research
using published, reproducible methods that yield quantifiable
results. The challenge is for stakeholders to closely monitor
how their audiences react. If they succeed, this will increase
their reach and contribute to the development of more
effective emergency management practices.
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